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Abstract
If the universe expands exponentially without end, “ordinary observers” like our-
selves may be vastly outnumbered by “Boltzmann’s brains,” transient observers who
briefly flicker into existence as a result of quantum or thermal fluctuations. One
might then wonder why we are so atypical. I show that tiny changes in physics—
for instance, extremely slow variations of fundamental constants—can drastically
change this result, and argue that one should be wary of conclusions that rely on
exact knowledge of the laws of physics in the very distant future.
The fact that we observe an orderly universe is in part a characteristic of the universe,
but also in part a characteristic of us. It is easy to understand why we should see order—we
are descended from a long line of evolutionary ancestors who successfully navigated their local
universe long enough to reproduce, while competitors who were unable to correctly perceive
the patterns of their environment were unlikely to have had descendants. As Rees [1], Dyson
et al. [2], and Page [3–5] have pointed out, though, another kind of “observer” is possible: a
“Boltzmann’s brain” [6], a transient observer appearing briefly as the result of a thermal or
quantum fluctuation.∗ The probability that a fluctuation in a given four-volume will produce
anything we would call an observer is, of course, extraordinarily small. But in an exponentially
expanding, eternal universe, such “Boltzmann’s brains” are inevitable, and under reasonable
circumstances might vastly outnumber ordinary observers like ourselves.
There is no reason to expect that such transient observers would experience an ordered
universe, much less one with the particular order we see. We might therefore ask why our
observations are so atypical. Whether this is a cause for worry is debatable—see, for instance,
[8]—but at least for anthropic arguments, it seems to be a real concern: it is hard to argue
that the universe should be suited to observers like us if typical observers are so completely
different.
The simplest answer, of course, is that the observed accelerated expansion of our Universe
may not be eternal. While many quintessence models lead to an asymptotically constant dark
energy density, for example, one can find others in which the effective cosmological constant
eventually decays to zero; see, for instance, [9–13]. Similarly, “cyclic universe” models [14] allow
periods of exponential expansion that can end before the production of “Boltzmann’s brains”
becomes significant. But observations are consistent with a true cosmological constant, and for
∗The term “Boltzmann’s brain” is a reference to Boltzmann’s argument [7] that our ordered, low entropy
universe could simply be a local thermal fluctuation in a much larger thermalized universe. Given this possibility,
it is easy to see that it is much more likely for a fluctuation to merely produce an isolated “observer.”
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models in which Λ is constant—for example, those based on the string landscape [15,16]—the
“Boltzmann’s brains” problem may pose a serious challenge.
A number of solutions to this puzzle have been proposed. If the number of ordinary observers
and the number of “Boltzmann’s brains” are both infinite, the relative probability depends on
the choice of measure, and choices exist for which ordinary observers predominate [17,18]. Or
perhaps the universe decays very rapidly [3,5]—or, with a “holographic” measure, not so rapidly
[19]—and “Boltzmann’s brains” have no time to appear. Or perhaps a global conservation law
forbids the fluctuations that could lead to the appearance of observers [20].
One purpose of this note is to point out another simple possibility. The probability of
a given thermal or quantum fluctuation depends on the value of a number of dimensionless
parameters such as the fine structure constant and the electron-proton mass ratio. If these
parameters vary in time, even at a rate much slower than current experimental limits, the
creation of “Boltzmann’s brains” may be strongly suppressed.
Consider, for example, two of the “Boltzmann’s brains” discussed by Page in [4]. A “brief
brain” appears as a quantum fluctuation, with energy E, characteristic length r, and action
S ∼ Er/~c. For a “brain” containing N nucleons,
E ∼ Nmpc2, r ∼ N1/3a0 = N1/3 ~
2
mee2
(1)
where mp is the proton mass, me is the electron mass, and a0 is the Bohr radius. The action
is thus
Sbb ∼ N4/3 mp
meα
. (2)
(For N on the order of 104 times Avogadro’s number, this agrees with Page’s estimate [4] of
Sbb ∼ 1042.) A “long brain” appears as a thermal fluctuation of de Sitter space, with an action
S ∼ βE, where β is the inverse de Sitter temperature; that is,
Slb ∼ 2πNmpc
2
~HΛ
(3)
where HΛ = c
√
Λ/3 is the asymptotic Hubble constant.
The probability of a fluctuation goes roughly as e−S , while the four-volume (at least for a
given “pocket universe”) grows as e3HΛt. The number of “Boltzmann’s brains” is thus
nbb(t) ∼ exp
{
−N4/3 mp
meα
+ 3HΛt
}
nlb(t) ∼ exp
{
−2πNmpc
2
~HΛ
+ 3HΛt
}
. (4)
These are, of course, very crude approximations, involving order-of-magnitude estimates in the
exponents, but they give a reasonable qualitative picture. In particular, at present (HΛt ∼ 1)
the numbers are tiny, but as t increases, they grow without limit.
Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the dimensionless parameters
appearing in S—the fine structure constant, the electron-proton mass ratio, etc.—are indepen-
dent of time. While this may be a reasonable starting point, it is by no means a certainty.
In Kaluza-Klein theories, for example, such constants depend on circumferences of compact
dimensions, which need not be time-independent [21, 22]; in string theory, they depend on
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moduli whose dynamics can be quite complex [23]. Time-varying “constants” can appear in
quintessence models [24, 25], in modifications of electromagnetism [26], in variable speed of
light models [27], and in brane world scenarios [28]; for more references, see [29]. So it is worth
examining the effect of relaxing the assumption of constancy.
Let us therefore suppose that our “physical constants” can vary in time. Then the exponent
in the number nbb of “brief brains” given by (4) will not grow as long as
µ˙1
µ1
+
α˙
α
< −3HΛN−4/3µ1α ∼ −10−52 yr−1 (5)
where µ1 = me/mp. This is about 36 orders of magnitude below present experimental limits
[30–36], and is not likely to be tested soon. For “long brains” the computation is slightly
more delicate, since one should only consider time dependence of dimensionless constants [37].
Here, the condition that the universe be asymptotically anti-de Sitter should presumably be
interpreted as a statement of the constancy of HΛ in Planck units. The relevant dimensionless
constant is then µ2 = mp/MPlanck, and the exponent in nlb will not grow in time as long as
µ˙2
µ2
>
3~H2
Λ
2πNmpc2
∼ 10−80 yr−1. (6)
I do not know of a clean experimental test of this quantity, but many of the searches for variation
of G—for instance, those based on stability of planetary orbits and on stellar evolution—can
be interpreted as limits on µ˙2/µ2. These are reviewed in [29]; see also [38]. Big Bang nucle-
osynthesis also gives limits that depend on both mp and MPlanck, which, barring unexpected
cancellations, should limit variations of µ2 [29, 39–41]. The time dependence (6) is then, opti-
mistically, at least 67 orders of magnitude below present observational limits.
Let me next address a few technical points:
1. If α, µ1, or µ2 vary in time, one might expect corresponding changes in Λ. For instance,
variations of α affect radiative corrections, and, through those, particle masses and zero-
point energies; a naive estimate leads to changes δΛ/Λ much larger than δα/α [42], large
enough to rule out even the tiny change (5). Changes in α or other constants also induce
time dependence of the potentials for the corresponding moduli, which can again lead
to variations in Λ [43] that can be eliminated only by fine-tuned cancellations.† Such
arguments should serve as warnings against accepting “varying constants” models too
uncritically, but they are not decisive: we must already require near-exact cancellation of
the vacuum contribution to Λ, and without knowing the mechanism of this cancellation
we cannot say whether it should be sensitive to variations in masses and couplings. If
the observed near-zero value of Λ is due to an accidental cancellation of vacuum energy
and a bare cosmological constant, for instance, then “varying constants” may be sharply
limited; if it is due to a dynamical mechanism, they may not be.
One may argue more directly for changes in Λ if the evolution of masses and coupling
constants is directly determined by a quintessence field. This certainly need not be the
case—string compactifications, for example, typically have large numbers of moduli with
complex dynamics [15,16,23], and any time dependence of vacuum energy may be quite
different from that of the moduli that determine masses and couplings. If Λ does vary
and Λ˙/Λ ∼ α˙/α, this variation first becomes important in (5) at a time on the order of
†The variations (5) and (6) actually fall comfortably below the “no fine tuning” limit of [43].
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1052 yr . Once this happens, the impact on the “Boltzmann’s brain” problem depends on
the sign of the variation: if Λ increases, it may compete with the variation of α, while if
Λ decreases, “brain” production is further suppressed.
2. In many models of varying constants, quantities such as α, µ1, and µ2 become asymptot-
ically time-independent once the universe starts to accelerate [44–46]. Such models will
not solve the “Boltzmann’s brains” problem, although if the relevant parameters do not
become time-independent too quickly, they may increase the amount of time available
for another solution such as vacuum decay. Note, however, that this asymptotic behavior
depends on both the potential (it comes from the dominance of Hubble friction) and the
relation between coupling constants and the underlying moduli. As the Appendix shows,
it is not hard to find models in which the asymptotic behavior is quite different.
3. I have so far been treating the time evolution of coupling constants and masses as a purely
classical phenomenon. As we know from eternal inflation, quantum fluctuations may be
important [47], and may disrupt the required monotonic evolution of these parameters,
pushing them back up the potential. This effect depends on the shape of the potential
and on the functional dependence of parameters such as α on the moduli. In particular,
one might expect trouble for this paper’s scenario if the moduli approach equilibrium. As
shown in the Appendix, however, it is easy to construct a run-away potential for which
the effect of quantum fluctuations is unimportant for the “Boltzmann’s brains” problem.
4. Over long enough times, even slow variations of fundamental constants may lead to
profound changes in physics. If 1/α grows linearly at the minimum rate allowed by (5),
for instance, the electromagnetic interaction of two protons will become comparable to
their gravitational interaction in about 1090 yr . An increase in µ2 at the minimum rate
allowed by (6) will have the same effect in about 1099 yr . It has been conjectured that
gravity cannot become stronger than gauge interactions [48]; if this is the case, new
physics would have to come into play. In any case, it is unlikely in this scenario that
“Boltzmann’s brains” in the far future would look anything like the “observers” we now
understand, and it is not clear that such objects would be possible at all.
Should we thus conclude that our existence as observers implies a time dependence of
fundamental constants? Presumably not. I know of three broad solutions to the “Boltzmann’s
brains” problem: dark energy density may not be (asymptotically) constant; our universe may
tunnel to a new configuration quickly enough to avoid overproduction of transient observers; or
masses, couplings, or other interactions may evolve in ways that reduce the “brain” production
rate. But within these categories, an enormous variety of particular solutions is available.
Dark energy could come from one of many inequivalent quintessence models. Tunneling could
take us to a universe with a different cosmological constant, as proposed by Page, but could
also take us to a vacuum in which, say, transient observers fail to appear because electroweak
symmetry is unbroken. Evolving couplings could suppress the production of “Boltzmann’s
brains” as described here, or could lead to a universe in which, for instance, the existence of
stable nucleons is no longer energetically favorable.
Nor are these solutions mutually exclusive. It is not hard to construct models, for example,
in which couplings evolve too slowly to permanently suppress the production of “Boltzmann’s
brains,” but fast enough to greatly increase the time available for tunneling. At the same
time, we have only a limited understanding of the requirements for an “observer”: the weakless
universe [49] provides one illustration of how drastically ordinary physics could change without
eliminating observers.
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Rather, the lesson here is that we should be cautious about arguments that require precise
extrapolation of our present knowledge of physics to the very distant future. We have seen
that truly tiny changes in fundamental constants, many orders of magnitude below current
observational limits, are enough to vitiate the “Boltzmann’s brains” argument. Given the
uncertainties in our knowledge and the extreme sensitivity of the analysis to such uncertainties,
it seems somewhat premature to draw conclusions about events 1042 years in the future.
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Appendix. Quantum fluctuations and varying constants
As noted above, quantum fluctuations may potentially be significant in evaluating the evolution
of coupling constants. Here, I will briefly explore this issue in a simple model.
Suppose the fine structure constant depends on a single scalar modulus ϕ.‡ The ϕ-dependent
part of the action can be written as
I = · · ·+
∫
d4x
√−g
[
1
4
α−1[ϕ]FabF
ab +
1
2
gab∂aϕ∂bϕ− V [ϕ]
]
. (A.1)
Let us take the simplest dependence of α on the modulus, α−1[ϕ] = ϕ/b, so that (2) becomes
Sbb ∼ N4/3mpϕ
meb
= aϕ. (A.2)
We shall assume—and later check—that the potential V [ϕ] makes a negligible contribution
to the cosmological constant, and that the evolution of ϕ is dominated by Hubble friction.
It is then known [47] that quantum fluctuations act as an effective white noise term in the
classical equations of motion, and that the probability of finding a value ϕ of the scalar field is
determined by the Smoluchowski equation
∂P (ϕ, t)
∂t
=
H3
8π2
∂2P (ϕ, t)
∂ϕ2
+
1
3H
∂
∂ϕ
(
dV
dϕ
P (ϕ, t)
)
. (A.3)
Let us now take V [ϕ] to be a linear potential, V [ϕ] = −kϕ, in the range of ϕ of interest.
Equation (A.3) is then equivalent to that for Brownian motion in a constant gravitational field,
and has the solution
P (ϕ, t) =
√
2π
H3t
exp
{
− 2π
2
H3t
(ϕ− ϕ¯(t))2
}
, (A.4)
where ϕ¯(t) = ϕ0 +
k
3H t is the classical solution. The average number of “Boltzmann’s brains”
is easily computed. From (A.2) and (A.4),
〈
e−Sbb
〉
=
∫
dϕP (ϕ, t)e−aϕ = e−S¯bbe
H
2
a
2
8pi2
Ht, (A.5)
‡While a varying α is itself a scalar field, it need not have an action with a standard, canonically normalized
kinetic term. Rather, it will normally be a function of other canonically normalized scalar fields, with a functional
form that cannot be determined from general arguments, but must be analyzed in particular models.
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where S¯bb is the classical action for “brief brains.” The brain number (4) thus becomes
〈nbb〉(t) ∼ exp
{
−N4/3 mp
meα
+ 3H˜t
}
with H˜ = H +
H2a2
24π2
. (A.6)
The “quantum correction” H2a2/24π2 goes as 1/b2, and is of order one for b ∼ 1MeV. We
must still check the consistency of our assumption that V [ϕ] does not contribute significantly
to Λ. To do this, note first that V˙ ∼ k2/H, and that Λ ∼ H2/T 2
Planck
. We thus want
ǫ =
1
H
V˙
Λ
∼ k
2T 2
Planck
H4
≪ 1. (A.7)
But α˙/α = −ϕ˙/ϕ ∼ k/Hϕ, so
a =
Sbb
ϕ
∼ H
k
Sbb
α˙
α
∼ H
k
S˙bb ∼ H
2
k
, (A.8)
where the final relation comes from our earlier condition that the number of “Boltzmann’s
brains” not grow in time. Thus
H2a2
24π2
∼ H
6
k2
∼ H
2T 2
Planck
ǫ
∼ 10
−120
ǫ
. (A.9)
The potential V can thus make a tiny contribution to the vacuum energy while still allowing
the quantum corrections to the classical evolution of α to be negligible.
This is, of course, a greatly oversimplified model, and I have not discussed such issues as
stability under radiative corrections. Moreover, a linear potential V will eventually lead to a
large change in the cosmological constant, although perhaps not for 10130 yr. Note, though,
that in one sense the model is rather conservative: I have made only minimal use of the freedom
to choose the function α−1[ϕ]. Simply choosing α−1 ∼ ϕ2 rather than α−1 ∼ ϕ would be enough
to guarantee that the growth in Sbb eventually beats the Hubble expansion, for instance, while
more complicated forms would allow much greater freedom in the choice of the potential V .
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